SOC 2 secrets and key management: what to keep and prove

Updated

SOC 2 does not set a rotation interval for keys or secrets. Konfirmity says it prescribes no specific tools or algorithms (Konfirmity), and SOC2Auditors.org says to set cadences from your documented risks and policies, not from a fixed SOC 2 schedule (SOC2Auditors.org). What the auditor tests is your own schedule: write one you can meet, keep an inventory of what exists, and keep a dated record each time a key or secret changes. These sources are vendors and a directory, not the AICPA, so confirm with your CPA firm.

What the sources say to keep

Konfirmity's secrets page lists access logs recording secret retrieval and changes (user, time, origin), rotation records, role-based access rules per service, inventories, and evidence that access requests were approved (Konfirmity). Its key management page adds a rotation calendar showing execution, key management service logs of rotation events, and records of retired keys (Konfirmity). Creately lists a dated screenshot of key configuration with rotation status, the access policy attached to each key, a key usage log extract for a date range, and an annual key access review signed and dated by the reviewer (Creately). SOC2Auditors.org's example evidence for encryption keys is key policies showing who can use and who can administer each key (SOC2Auditors.org).

A secrets inventory you can copy

Konfirmity's example table has these columns (Konfirmity), and its text adds last rotation date and who can approve changes. Put it in a sheet and keep it current:

ColumnWhat goes in it
Secret IDA stable name, never the value
OwnerThe person who answers for it
System and environmentWhere it is used, and production or not
SensitivityWhat it unlocks
Rotation frequencyThe interval your policy sets
Last rotation and approverDate, and who approved the change

Where the sources differ on intervals

SourceWhat it says about rotation
KonfirmityNo SOC 2 interval. Cites Tencent Cloud (symmetric keys every 90 days) and Azure Key Vault (at least every two years); gives its own example of 90 days for data keys and 12 months for key-encrypting keys
SOC2Auditors.orgSecrets: per event (owner leaves, key exposed). Cadences are common choices, set from your own risks
CreatelyAt least annually, matched to policy; automatic where the platform supports it

Konfirmity and Creately both sell compliance or template products; SOC2Auditors.org describes itself as an independent market intelligence platform and is a directory, not an audit firm. The figures are theirs or the cloud providers', not AICPA numbers.

Where it fails

Konfirmity lists seven common failures, including credentials in code or configuration files, manual rotation and revocation, over-permissive service accounts, missing audit logs, overlooked vendor credentials, and not rotating after staff changes (Konfirmity). Creately says the common finding is that automatic rotation is disabled or undocumented (Creately). A control that fails once in the period shows up in a Type 2 report, so a rotation that quietly stopped matters more than a missed first run.

What the generated policy says

Policyseed sells a kit, so read these as one example, not a requirement. The generated Encryption and Key Management Policy sets the schedule; its numbers are a starting choice you can change. For the encryption side see does SOC 2 require encryption.

Application secrets, service credentials and API tokens live only in the designated secrets manager and are injected at runtime. They are never committed to GitHub, printed in GitHub Actions logs, baked into images or shared by chat or email. Secret scanning and push protection are enabled on all repositories in GitHub, and GitHub Actions masks secret values in logs.

Encryption and Key Management Policy, item 4.5

Rotation follows a defined schedule: key management root keys at least annually with automatic rotation where supported; broadly privileged service credentials and API tokens every 90 days; other application secrets at least every 12 months; and any key or secret immediately when compromise is suspected or when a person with direct access leaves or changes role.

Encryption and Key Management Policy, item 4.6

Inventory. Engineering maintains an inventory of every key management key, secrets manager entry, SSH key, signing key and TLS certificate with owner, purpose, location, rotation schedule and last rotation. It is reviewed quarterly against live configuration on AWS and Vercel and in GitHub Actions; anything unrecorded is documented or removed.

Encryption and Key Management Policy, item 5.1

Rotation. Engineering keeps a rotation calendar derived from the inventory. Automatic rotation is preferred; manual rotation follows a written runbook that issues the new version, updates consumers, verifies function and retires the old version within 7 days. Each rotation is recorded in the inventory.

Encryption and Key Management Policy, item 5.3

Offboarding rotation. When a person with direct access to any shared secret, key or certificate leaves or changes role, People Operations notifies Engineering on the last working day and Engineering rotates every secret the person could reach within one business day, removes their SSH keys and access tokens and records completion.

Encryption and Key Management Policy, item 5.8

Tie rotation to departures through the offboarding evidence guide, limit who can read production secrets as in the production access guide, and log any gap in the exception register. The asset inventory sheet is a model for the inventory layout.

Frequently asked questions

How often must keys rotate for SOC 2?
The criteria set no interval. Konfirmity says SOC 2 does not prescribe specific tools or algorithms and that auditors expect a documented, automated rotation schedule. SOC2Auditors.org says to set cadences from your documented risks and policies, not from a fixed SOC 2 schedule. Creately suggests at least annual rotation, which it presents as its process guidance. Pick an interval you will meet, write it down, and keep a record each time.
Do I need a hardware key vault or HSM?
None of the fetched sources says SOC 2 requires one. Konfirmity's secrets page does not mention hardware security modules and refers to vaults, managed cloud key services such as AWS KMS and disk encryption. SOC2Auditors.org's example control says to manage keys in your provider's key management service. Your own policy decides; the example policy text below uses the provider's key service.
What if a developer left and knew a shared secret?
SOC2Auditors.org's example control says to rotate or revoke credentials when an owner leaves or a key is exposed, with a per-event cadence. Konfirmity lists failing to rotate secrets after staff changes or departures among common failures. Record the rotation next to the offboarding record.
Is a secret in a private repository a finding?
Konfirmity lists storing credentials in code or configuration files as a common failure. Whether your auditor writes it up depends on how your control is worded and what the sample shows. The usual fix is a secrets manager with secret scanning turned on, and a dated replacement record for anything that leaked.
What evidence shows key rotation actually happened?
Konfirmity lists rotation logs, a rotation calendar showing execution and key management service logs of rotation events. Creately lists a dated screenshot of key configuration with rotation status and a key access log extract for a defined date range. With automatic rotation, export the service's own log; with manual rotation, keep a dated ticket per rotation.

Policyseed provides governance policy templates and AI tailoring. It is not legal advice and not a compliance guarantee. Management adopts the policies; the CPA firm performs the SOC 2 examination.